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Abstract
In many markets, there are switching costs and network effects. Yet the literature gener-
ally deals with them separately. This paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction
(or “indirect bargain”) in a dynamic two-sided market. It shows that in the symmetric
equilibrium, the classic result that the first-period price is U-shaped in switching costs
does not emerge, but instead switching costs always intensify the first-period price com-
petition. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period
price on the other side. Policies that ignore these effects may overestimate the extent to
which switching costs can reduce welfare.
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1 Introduction
There are countless examples of markets in which there are switching costs and network effects.1
In the existing literature, there is a wealth of works in the dual areas of switching costs and
two-sided markets, which, for instance, finds that high switching costs cause firms to charge
more to their locked-in customers (Klemperer, 1987b), whereas large network externalities
cause platforms to charge less (Armstrong, 2006a). On the other hand, very little is known
or understood about how markets react to the interaction between the two forces. This paper
provides new insights on how switching costs and network externalities affect firms’ pricing
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strategies. It shows that in the presence of both effects, welfare analyses that merely sum up
the bargain effects of switching costs and network externalities in the introductory period are
prone to error.
A useful example is the smartphone operating system market. Apple, Google and Windows
are key players in the market. Each of them faces two groups of consumers: application users
and application developers. While it is easy for consumers to migrate data from an older
version of Windows Phone to a newer one, a consumer switching from Android to Windows
Phone incurs the cost of migrating—if not re-purchasing—a set of apps, media files, as well
as contacts, calendars, emails and messages.2 As Hal Berenson suggests, one of the problems
faced by Windows Phone is its weak app library.3 Suppose now that Windows improves its
library by introducing more Android apps. This not only raises the utility of users through
the network externality but also lowers their switching costs in terms of data migration. For
instance, making some Android movie or music streaming apps available also for Windows
Phone enables users to migrate their media files across devices more easily without the hassle of
moving the data manually, which results in lower switching costs. Such a change may seem to be
welfare-improving because the extent to which platforms can exploit their locked-in customers
is smaller. In a model incorporating both switching costs and network effects, however, I show
that a decrease in switching costs of users leads to an increase in the price for developers.
Since developers value the participation of users and a decrease in switching costs of users
makes attracting users easier, the platform can price higher to extract the increased value to
developers. As a consequence, lower switching costs may not improve overall consumer welfare.
Identifying this cross-group effect of switching costs is one of the main contributions this paper
as this effect does not emerge from the classic Armstrong’s (2006a) two-sided model due to the
model’s static property or from the classic Klemperer’s (1987b) switching cost model due to
the one-sidedness of his model. Moreover, the existence of cross-group effects emphasizes that
regulators need to consider the interaction between switching costs and network externalities
carefully and avoid a mechanical analysis of them by simply adding up their effects, since
the overall effect across all consumer groups, through feedback effects, can be larger than the
sum of effects. The analysis also considers the implications from both regulatory (e.g., welfare
concerns about switching costs) and managerial points of view (e.g., how switching costs and
network effects affect the profits of platforms, which may lead to very different app/OS design
strategies beyond pricing), and provides insight into other two-sided markets with switching
costs, such as media, credit cards, video games, and search engines.
To gain these insights, I develop a two-period duopoly model, where platforms 0 and 1
sell their products to two groups of consumers. Each group is represented by a Hotelling line
with unit length. Each consumer can purchase from either platform (single-homing). The
2In reality, there are also other types of switching costs (e.g., the cost of learning how to operate a new
interface and the psychological inclination to stick with what we know). See Klemperer (1995) and National
Economic Research Associates (2003).
3As discussed in his blog post about “Will Microsoft get the new Surface(s) right? Part 1,” May 8 2014,
available at hal2020.com, he said, “High price [and] lack of consumption apps... doomed the Surface. They
could have broken through by pricing the Surface aggressively to drive sales volume that created a pull on app
developers. But they didn’t. Consumers stayed away.”
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penultimate section extends the analysis to cover the multi-homing case. There are both
switching costs, i.e., consumers exhibit inertia in their product choice, and indirect network
externalities, i.e., participation of one group increases the value of participating for the other
group. Consumers are farsighted, which means that they make decisions based on their lifetime
utility, and have independent preferences across periods. I consider the following game. In the
first period consumers decide which platform to join, and in the second they learn their second-
period preferences, and bear a switching cost if they decide to switch to another platform.
Moreover, I focus on the symmetric equilibrium, in which, for each side, the prices charged by
the two platforms are the same—that is, in the smartphone example the two platforms charge
users the same price, and they charge developers the same price. This model is flexible enough
to collapse to either a pure switching cost model or to a pure two-sided model for extreme
parameter values. When both effects are at work, I show that conventional results will change:
the overall bargain effect in this model can be larger than the sum of effects in pure switching
cost and pure two-sided models.
The main results can be summarized as follows. I show that in equilibrium switching costs
do not affect second-period prices, whereas the impact of switching costs on first-period prices
depends on the strength of two effects. The first is the consumer anticipation effect: more
patient consumers are less tempted by a temporary price cut because they understand that the
price cut will later be followed by a price rise. Their demand therefore is less elastic, and plat-
forms will respond by charging higher prices. The second effect is the firm anticipation effect:
more patient platforms put more weight on future profits, hence both compete aggressively
for market share. When network externalities are weak, the first-period price is U-shaped in
switching costs: the firm anticipation effect dominates when switching costs are small, while
the consumer anticipation effect dominates when switching costs are large. When externali-
ties become sufficiently strong, however, the consumer anticipation effect is weakened because
consumers value the platform for facilitating their interaction with the other side even though
they anticipate that the platform might exploit their reluctance to switch later. Consequently,
switching costs with strong network externalities overturn the standard U-shaped result and
always intensify the first-period price competition. This effect is new in the literature because
both the consumer and firm anticipation effects are absent from Armstrong’s (2006a) model
and the consumer anticipation effect goes in the opposite direction in Klemperer’s (1987b)
model. Furthermore, there is another new cross-group effect that is absent in both of these
models: an increase in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases the price on the
other side. The reason is that platforms can build market share on one side either by directly
lowering the price on this side or by indirectly increasing the participation on the other side.
When switching costs on the first side are large, an easier way to build market share is to focus
on the indirect channel; consequently the first-period competition is intensified on the other
side. I call this new interaction between switching costs and network externalities an “indi-
rect bargain effect”, as opposed to the traditional “direct bargain effect” of switching costs in
Klemperer’s (1987b) model, where indirect network externalities are absent, see Proposition 3
for details.
One of the major contributions of this paper is that it provides some general guidance for
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understanding how markets react to switching costs and network externalities in the absence
of Coasian bargaining.4 While the existing literature has tended to focus on either switching
costs or network externalities, I study the two concepts together and show that switching costs
may work differently in two-sided markets as compared to one-sided ones.5 The important
policy rule is to recognize the role of the indirect bargain effect, and factor the effect into
the overall assessment of the effects of switching costs. Regulators should not merely sum up
the effects of switching costs and network externalities in traditional models because failing to
account for the indirect bargain effect may overestimate the extent to which switching costs
can reduce welfare (see Section 4). Furthermore, from a managerial perspective, the result
that switching costs and network externalities reduce platforms’ profits explains why strategies
of lowering either or both of them are frequently employed in practice. To reduce switching
costs, platforms have tried to deliver apps and services across a breadth of OS (e.g., between
Windows and Android as well as between Windows and iOS). To reduce network externalities,
platforms have tried to deliver services across a breadth of devices that belong to their own
ecosystem only (see Section 3).
The indirect bargain effect holds even in richer analyses with other forms of consumer het-
erogeneity and price discrimination that are rarely studied in the two-sided market literature.6
The main conclusion of this paper is that when there are network externalities, switching costs
should be less of a concern to policymakers, because they not only have their own bargain
effect directly on prices but also have an indirect bargain effect. In Section 5, I show that
this policy conclusion remains valid even in a number of variations on the model, e.g., when
consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their level of farsightedness and loyalty, and when
third-degree price discrimination is feasible. Furthermore, this paper covers compatibility pol-
icy more broadly, as we can easily interpret switching costs as the difference between the cost
of migration across platforms and the cost of backward compatibility when staying with one
platform without changing the qualitative results. An interesting twist is then more compat-
ibility between new and older versions of one platform’s products can be more beneficial to
consumers in a market with network externalities than in a market without network exter-
nalities, because in the alternative interpretation, an increase in switching costs may mean
increasing the compatibility between the products of one platform.
1.1 Related Literature
There is a sizeable literature on switching costs which, broadly speaking, can be categorized
into two main groups.7 One group of papers assumes that firms cannot discriminate between
4The Coase (1960) Theorem does not apply in this model because I focus on simple spot price contracts,
which cannot eliminate the inefficiencies caused by switching costs. Moreover, as defined by Rochet and Tirole
(2006), a necessary condition for a market to be two-sided is that Coasian bargaining cannot take place.
5By one-sided markets I mean markets without indirect network externalities.
6Heterogeneity in consumers is unusual in the two-sided literature except for a few recent papers focusing on
matching problem, e.g., Gomes and Pavan (2013). Also, poaching is largely an unexplored topic. One exception
is Liu and Serfes (2013), who examine the effect of first-degree price discrimination in two-sided markets.
7Farrell and Klemperer (2007) and Klemperer (1995) provide excellent overviews on the literature of switch-
ing costs.
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old and new consumers. As firms know that they can exercise market power in the second
period over those consumers who are locked-in, they are willing to charge a lower price in the
first period in order to acquire these valuable customers. This “bargains-then-ripoffs” pattern
is the main result of the first-generation switching cost models (see, e.g., Klemperer 1987a,
1987b). A second group of works allows for price discrimination so firms can charge a price to
its old customers and a different price to new ones. Chen (1997) analyzes a two-period duopoly
with homogeneous goods. Under duopoly, consumers who leave their current supplier have only
one firm to switch to. Since there is no competition for switchers, this allows the duopolist to
earn positive profits in equilibrium. Taylor (2003) extends Chen’s model to many periods and
many firms. With three or more firms, there are at least two firms vying for switchers, and
if products are undifferentiated, these firms will compete away all their future profits. More
recent contributions include Biglaiser, Cre´mer and Dobos (2013), who study the consequence
of heterogeneity of switching costs in an infinite horizon model with free entry.8 They show
that even low switching cost customers are valuable for the incumbent.
The design of pricing strategies to induce consumers on both sides to participate has occu-
pied a central place in the research on two-sided markets.9 The pioneering work is Caillaud and
Jullien (2003), who analyze a model of imperfect price competition between undifferentiated
intermediaries. In the case where all consumers must single-home, the only equilibrium in-
volves one platform attracting all consumers and the platform making zero profit. In contrast,
when consumers can multi-home, the pricing strategy is of a “divide-and-conquer” nature: the
single-homing side is subsidized (divide), while the multi-homing side has its entire surplus
extracted (conquer). Armstrong (2006a) advances the analysis by putting forward a model
of competition between differentiated platforms by using the Hotelling specification. He finds
that the equilibrium price is determined by the magnitude of cross-group externalities and
whether consumers single-home or multi-home. His approach comes closest to mine. However,
he focuses on a static model of a two-sided market without switching costs while here with
switching costs and different degrees of sophistication the problem becomes a dynamic one. An-
other closely related paper is Rochet and Tirole (2006), who combine usage and membership
externalities (as opposed to the pure-usage-externality model of Rochet and Tirole (2003), and
the pure-membership-externality model of Armstrong (2006a)), and derive the optimal pricing
formula. They, however, focus on the analysis of a monopoly platform.
This study apart, there is little literature that studies the interaction between switching
costs and network externalities. Su and Zeng (2008) analyze a two-period model of two-sided
competing platforms. Their focus is on the optimal pricing strategy when only one group of
consumers has switching costs and their preferences are independent, and hence their model
applies only to a limited subset of multi-sided markets, such as browsers, search engines, and
shopping malls,10 whereas this paper studies a richer setting in which both sides bear switching
8Other papers, such as Einav and Somaini (2013) and Rhodes (2014), also examine the effect of switching
costs in a dynamic setting, but there are no network externalities.
9See Rysman (2009) and Weyl (2010) for excellent overviews on the literature of two-sided markets.
10In the market for browsers, users can switch relatively more easily between Internet Explorer, Chrome,
and Firefox than content providers: whereas users only need to uninstall the old browser and install the new
one, content providers need to rewrite their codes so that the codes are compatible with the new browser. For
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costs. This seems a more natural feature of many markets, such as smartphone and video
games. More importantly, ignoring the switching costs of one group of consumers and focusing
on independent preferences sever the connections between the first-period and second-period
utilities of these consumers, and hence the indirect bargain (which is the focus here) would
vanish in their setting. Biglaiser and Cre´mer (2011, 2014, 2016) and Biglaiser, Cre´mer and
Dobos (2013), in a series of papers, compare the effect of switching costs and network effects
on entry in a one-sided market. They show that switching costs and network effects together
can have complicated effects on the profits of the incumbent, which depends on the relative
importance of switching costs versus network effects. However, this model differs from theirs
in that I focus on the interaction between “two-sided” network effects and switching costs,
whereas they focus more on “one-sided” network effects. Similarly, Suleymanova and Wey
(2011) analyze how switching costs and network effects affect market structure, but in a static
model and with one-sided network effects. This means that in their models switching costs of
one type of consumers do not affect prices of the other type, which is one of the key elements I
am studying here. This is also one of the key forces that lead to the whole effect of switching
costs and network effects being greater than the sum of its parts in this model.
2 Model
Consider a two-sided market with two periods. Each side i ∈ {A,B} of the market is charac-
terized by a Hotelling line with unit length, and two platforms are located at the endpoints 0
and 1 on each side. That is, platform 0 is located at 0 and platform 1 at 1 on both sides of A
and B.
On each side i, there is a unit mass of consumers, who are uniformly distributed on the
Hotelling line. A consumer on side i can switch to the other platform at a cost si. Assume
that all consumer preferences are independent across the two periods, which means that each
consumer is randomly relocated on the Hotelling line in the second period. Independent pref-
erences can be interpreted as consumers having changing tastes, or consumers being ignorant
about their future tastes.11 This assumption is needed for technical reason because it smoothes
the demand function, which is a standard assumption in the switching costs literature (see,
e.g., Klemperer 1987b; Einav and Somaini 2013). Moreover, assume that all consumers are far-
sighted, which means that on each side consumers make decisions based on their lifetime utility,
search engines, switching costs are almost negligible for users as they can switch easily between Google, Bing
and Yahoo in as little as one click, but switching costs are larger for publishers because they need to pay again a
fee to another search engine so that their websites will appear at the top of the search results. And for shopping
malls, shoppers are free to go to any shopping malls, but there are high transaction costs for shop owners in
terminating the old contract and initiating a new one.
11A survey published by Consumer Intelligence Research Partners (CIRP) reveals that 20% of Apple’s new
iPhone customers were previous Android phone owners. The possibility of learning new information overtime
could be one reason why consumers switch, as it is difficult for consumers to fully understand in advance their
taste for apps and smartphones, which are constantly evolving. This quarterly survey was taken from data
surveying 500 subjects in the U.S. who had purchased a new mobile phone in the previous 90 days over the
last four quarters, between July 2012 and June 2013.
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and discount the second-period utility at rate δi. Further, assume that consumers single-home,
i.e., they choose to join only one platform in each period.
In Section 5, I show that the main results continue to hold when some consumers are
loyal (i.e., their preferences do not change), when some consumers are myopic (i.e., they make
decisions based on their first-period utility only), when multi-homing decisions are allowed,
when price discrimination is feasible, and when there are some asymmetries between different
groups of consumers, as well as between platforms.
Platforms and consumers have common knowledge about consumer preferences and the
value of switching cost si. The timing of the game is as follows:
• At the beginning of the first period, consumers are unattached to any platforms. They
learn their initial preferences. Platforms set the first-period prices. Consumers choose
which platform to join.
• At the beginning of the second period, consumers learn their second-period preferences.
Platforms set the second-period prices. Consumers decide to switch or not.
The solution concept for the game is subgame perfect equilibrium.
The utility of a consumer on side i at time t, who is located at x, is
vi + ein
j
k,t − |x− k| − pik,t,
where i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j. Let vi denote the intrinsic value of consumers on side i for
using either platform. Assume that vi is sufficiently large such that the market is fully covered.
The benefit that a consumer from side i enjoys from interacting with any consumer on the
other side is given by ei, and n
i
k,t denotes the market share of platform k on side i in period
t, where k ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {A,B} and t ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, einjk,t is the total external benefit from
interacting with the other side of the market. The transport cost when a consumer purchases
from platform k is given by |x−k|, where the unit cost is normalized to one. Platform k charges
a uniform price pik,t on side i in period t. Assume for simplicity that consumer utility does not
depend on the number of people on the same side in the current period, and the number of
people on the other side in previous periods.
Assuming that the marginal cost of production is equal to zero, platform k’s profit in period
t is given by
pik,t = p
A
k,tn
A
k,t + p
B
k,tn
B
k,t, (1)
which is the sum of revenues from side A and side B. Both platforms discount the second-
period profit at rate δF . Moreover, I assume the following: First, assume that si ∈ [0, 1),
where one is the unit transport cost, so that at least some consumers will switch. Second,
assume ei ∈ [0, 1) in order to ensure that the profit function is well-defined, and the demand is
decreasing in a platform’s own price and increasing in its rival’s price. Finally, platforms charge
uniform prices and they cannot price discriminate among their previous customers and those
who have bought the rival’s product in the previous period (this assumption will be relaxed in
Section 5.4).
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2.1 Second Period: the mature market
I work backward from the second period, where each platform has already established a cus-
tomer base. Given first-period market shares nA0,1 and n
B
0,1, a consumer on side i, located at
θi0 on the unit interval, purchased from platform 0 in the first period is indifferent between
continuing to buy from platform 0 and switching to platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi0 − pi0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi0)− pi1,2 − si.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi0 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 + si].
Another consumer on side i, positioned at θi1, previously purchased from platform 1 is
indifferent between switching to platform 0 and continuing to purchase from platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi1 − pi0,2 − si = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi1)− pi1,2.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi1 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 − si].
The second-period demand for platform 0 on side i is then given by
ni0,2 = n
i
0,1θ
i
0 + (1− ni0,1)θi1, (2)
which consists of its first-period customers, who do not switch in the second period (the first
term on the right hand side), and the first-period customers of platform 1, who switch to
platform 0 in the second period (the second term on the right hand side). The total demand
for platform 1 is defined similarly.
Solving for the second-period market shares and substituting them into the profit functions,
we obtain the following second-period prices:
Proposition 1. Given first-period market shares nik,1, i ∈ {A,B}, k ∈ {0, 1}, the second period
prices are given by
pi0,2 = 1− ej +
ηi(2n
i
0,1 − 1)si + i(2nj0,1 − 1)sj
∆
,
and
pi1,2 = 1− ej −
ηi(2n
i
0,1 − 1)si + i(2nj0,1 − 1)sj
∆
,
where ∆ = 9− (eA + 2eB)(eB + 2eA) > 0, ηi = 3− ej(ej + 2ei) > 0, and i = ei − ej.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The second-period prices consist of two parts: the first part, 1 − ej, is independent of
switching costs, and is analogous to the result in the one-period model of Armstrong (2006a);
on the other hand, the second term is related to switching costs. A closer examination of the
second term shows the following.
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Corollary 1. Given first-period market shares, on side i, i ∈ {A,B}, the platform with a
larger market share (nik,1 > 1/2), k ∈ {0, 1}, increases the second-period price pik,2 as switching
costs si increase; whereas the other platform with a smaller market share (n
i
k,1 < 1/2) decreases
the second-period price pik,2 as switching costs si increase. When platforms have equal market
shares in the first period (ni0,1 = n
i
1,1), switching cost si does not affect second-period prices
pik,2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This result is standard in the switching cost literature, where two effects are at play: On
the one hand, the platform might want to exploit its locked-in customers with a high price
due to its market power over these customers. On the other hand, the platform might want
to poach its rival’s customers with a low price. A larger market share means exploiting old
customers is more profitable than attracting new consumers. Notice that if both platforms
have equal market share in the first period, these two effects offset each other, which means
that switching cost does not affect second period prices. This is indeed what happens in the
symmetric equilibrium (see Proposition 2). However, analyzing second-period pricing strategy
is important because it determines the intertemporal effect of first-period pricing: a first-period
price change will lead to a change in the second-period profit and hence the second-period price.
Moreover, there is a new cross-group effect of switching cost, i.e., the pricing on one side
also depends on the switching cost on the other side.
Corollary 2. Given first-period market shares, the second-period price of platform 0, pi0,2, is
increasing in switching costs on the other side sj if
(i) Consumers on side j are more valuable (ei > ej), and platform 0 has a larger market
share on side j as compared to platform 1 (nj0,1 > 1/2 > n
j
1,1), or
(ii) Consumers on side i are more valuable (ei < ej), and platform 0 has a smaller market
share on side j as compared to platform 1 (nj0,1 < 1/2 < n
j
1,1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
More specifically, switching costs on side j create some market power for platforms, which
is captured by the term (2nj0,1−1)sj. Such market power can be extended to side i in two ways.
First, the value of attracting consumers on side i increases when they generate positive network
externalities on side j. This tends to intensify competition on side i, and reduces the price
by −ej(2nj0,1 − 1)sj/∆. Second, the value of attracting consumers on side i goes down when
side j generates positive network externalities on side i. This tends to weaken competition on
side i, and increases the price by ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1)sj/∆. The overall effect is then positive in two
situations: (i) when a platform has more market power than its rival, meaning that it has a
larger first-period customer base (that is, nj0,1 > 1/2), and the effect of weakening competition
is stronger than the intensifying effect (that is, ei > ej), which reinforces the market power
created by switching costs; and (ii) when a platform has less market power than its rival (that
is, nj0,1 < 1/2), the price on side j decreases as sj increases. This reduces the value of attracting
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consumers on side i, and reverses the sign of the two effects. That is, −ej(2nj0,1 − 1)sj/∆ now
becomes positive, whereas ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1)sj/∆ becomes negative. Since ei < ej, the first effect
dominates, and the price on side i increases. Note that what platform 1 will do is just the
opposite of platform 0 because the market is fully covered.
2.2 First Period: the new market
I now turn to the first-period equilibrium outcomes when consumers are unattached. If a
consumer on side i located at θiR joins platform 0 in the first period, his expected second-
period utility is given by
U i0,2 =
∫ θi0
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − x− pi0,2)dx+
∫ 1
θi0
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− x)− pi1,2 − si)dx.
The first term captures the situation in which the consumer’s preference has changed a little
(that is, x < θi0) and chooses to stay with platform 0, and the second term captures the
situation in which the consumer’s preference has changed a lot (that is, x > θi0) and chooses
to switch to platform 1, despite there being some switching costs.
Similarly, if he joins platform 1 in the first period, his expected second-period utility is
given by
U i1,2 =
∫ 1
θi1
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− x)− pi1,2)dx+
∫ θi1
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − x− pi0,2 − si)dx.
A consumer on side i is indifferent between purchasing from platform 0 and platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiR − pi0,1 + δiU i0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiR)− pi1,1 + δiU i1,2.
After some rearrangement, this gives
θiR =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δi(U i0,2 − U i1,2)],
and this is also the first-period market share of platform 0 on side i, that is, ni0,1 = θ
i
R.
Hence, we can derive the profit functions, and solve for the equilibrium prices. I focus on
the platform-symmetric equilibrium, which means that both platforms charge the same price
to each side (that is, pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 and p
B
0,1 = p
B
1,1).
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Proposition 2. The single-homing model has a unique symmetric equilibrium. The equilibrium
prices are given by
pi0,1 = 1− ej − κis2i − σjsjsi − δF ξisi,
and
pi0,2 = 1− ej,
where σi and ξi are positive, κi may be positive or negative, for i, j ∈ {A,B}, and j 6= i.
12When ei and si are relatively small, I show in Appendix B that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
However, analyzing the existence of other asymmetric equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Proof. See Appendix B, where expressions for κi, σi, and ξi are also given.
The derivation of the equilibrium is in Appendix B, and the intuitions are as follows: the
existence and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium requires that platforms’ profits are
concave (see Equation B.1), and there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium prices
both on and off the equilibrium path (see Equation B.3 and B.4).13
Both Klemperer (1987b) and Armstrong (2006a) are special cases of this model. More
particularly, when there are no switching costs (si = 0), or neither the consumers nor the firms
care about the future (δi, δF = 0), i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period equilibrium price becomes
pi = 1− ej,
which is the same as that in Proposition 2 of Armstrong (2006a). This equation shows that
platforms compete fiercely for the more valuable group, whose external benefit exerted on the
other group of consumers is larger.
On the other hand, when there are no indirect network externalities (ei = 0), i ∈ {A,B},
the first-period equilibrium price becomes
pi0,1 = 1 +
2
3
( δis
2
i︸︷︷︸
consumer anticipation
− δF si︸︷︷︸
firm anticipation
),
which is equivalent to Equation (18) in Klemperer (1987b).14
Since the level of the first-period price is lower in a market with switching costs than
without them, the literature calls it a “bargain”. However, the extent of the bargain depends
on switching costs. More specifically, Klemperer (1987b) shows that the first-period price is U-
shaped in switching costs: whether the first-period price increases or decreases with switching
costs depends on the relative strength of the consumer and the firm anticipation effects. On
the one hand, farsighted consumers anticipate that if they are locked-in in the second period,
the platform will raise its price. Thus, consumers are less responsive to a first-period price cut.
This explains why consumer sophistication increases the first-period price through δi. On the
other hand, forward-looking platforms have strong incentives to invest in market share because
they anticipate the benefit of having a larger customer base in the future. Thus, platform
sophistication decreases the first-period price through δF .
13Notice that although I focus on the analysis of symmetric equilibrium, its existence does not require all
parameters on the two sides (eA and eB , sA and sB) to be completely symmetric, provided that consumers on
each side view the platforms as symmetric. I briefly discuss the case of asymmetric platforms where it is more
costly to switch from one platform to the other (s0 6= s1) in Section 5.3.
14In Klemperer’s equation,
pA1 = p
B
1 = c+ t
{
1 + λ
[
(1− µ− ν) + 2
3(µ+ ν)
[
(1− µ− ν) + µs
t
]2]}
− 2λ
3(µ+ ν)
[(1− µ− ν)t+ µs],
c is the marginal cost of production, which is equal to 0 here, ν represents new consumers, which is equal to 0
here, µ represents consumers with changing preferences, which is equal to 1 here, 1−ν−µ represents consumers
with unchanged preferences, which is equal to 0 here, λ is the discount factor, which is equal to δi and δF here,
and t and s are defined similarly as transport cost and switching cost.
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2.3 The Indirect Bargain
The pattern of attractive introductory offers followed by higher prices to exploit locked-in
customers—the “bargains-then-ripoffs” pricing—is well-known in the literature. However, this
analysis is the first to decouple the “direct” bargain effect of switching costs in the first period
from the “indirect” bargain effect.15 More specifically,
• A direct bargain means that the first-period price is lower with switching costs than
without, as defined in Klemperer (1987b).
• An indirect bargain means increasing participation on one side increases the value of
the platform to the other side, and such indirect network effects leads to an even bigger
bargain effect of switching costs for consumers on the other side, which is a new effect in
the literature.
Let us now examine this indirect bargain more formally.
Proposition 3. In the single-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally
patient δi = δF = δ > 0, and symmetric externalities ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B}, the first-period
price is given by
pi0,1 = 1 −e︸︷︷︸
Armstrong (2006a)
+
2δ
3
(s2i − si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Klemperer (1987b)
− δ
3(1− e2)(e
2s2i + esisj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect bargain
.
There exists a threshold e¯ = (
√
s2j + 32− sj)/8 ∈ (0, 1) such that
i. If network externalities are weak (e < e¯), on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is U-
shaped in switching costs si.
ii. If network externalities are strong (e ≥ e¯), on each side the first-period price pi0,1 is
decreasing in switching costs si.
iii. The first-period price charged to side i, pi0,1, is decreasing in switching costs on side j, sj.
iv. The first-period price charged to side i, pi0,1, is decreasing in network externalities, e.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 shows that the extent of the bargain does not depend only on switching costs
on one side (as in Klemperer) and the strength of network externalities (as in Armstrong), but
also on switching costs on the other side, which operates through the indirect bargain.
More specifically, part (i) shows that when network externalities are weak, we attain the
same result as Klemperer: the first-period price is U-shaped in switching costs. The reason
15Notice that although the “ripoff” effect in the literature, which means the second-period price paid by
consumers is higher in a market with switching costs than in a market without switching costs, does not emerge
in the basic model, under price discrimination the ripoff effect on a platform’s existing customers can emerge,
as shown in Section 5.4.
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is that switching costs have two opposing effects on the first-period price. First, the firm
anticipation effect tends to lower the first-period price: as platforms can charge higher prices
to exploit locked-in customers in the second period, they will compete aggressively for first-
period market shares. Second, the consumer anticipation effect tends to increase the first-period
price: anticipating that platforms will take advantage of the locked-in customers in the second
period, consumers are less responsive to first-period price cuts. Because the firm anticipation
effect is stronger for low switching costs and the consumer anticipation effect is stronger for
high switching costs, the U shape emerges.
Part (ii) describes the first term in the indirect bargain. It shows that strong externalities
overturn the U-shaped result: the first-period price is always decreasing in switching costs,
and the positive relationship between the first-period price and switching costs does not arise.
The reason is that network externalities together with switching costs weaken the consumer
anticipation effect because participation on the other side increases the value of the platform,
even though consumers anticipate that the platform might exploit their reluctance to switch
later. Consequently, switching costs always lead to more first-period price competition when
externalities are strong. This effect differs from Armstrong (2006a): since he examines a static
two-sided model, both the consumer and firm anticipation effects are absent. It also differs
from Klemperer (1987): the consumer anticipation effect in his model softens price competition,
while the effect in this model intensifies competition through the indirect bargain.
Part (iii) describes the second term in the indirect bargain. It shows that an increase
in switching costs on one side unambiguously decreases the first-period price charged to the
other side. The reason is that platforms can build market share on side j via two channels:
directly through side j, and indirectly through side i. When switching costs on side j are large,
consumers are less responsive to price cuts because they expect a price rise to follow in the
second period. An easier way to build market share on side j is then to focus on the indirect
channel, i.e., attracting side i. As a result, the first-period price competition is increased on
side i.
Furthermore, because a larger sj makes it more attractive for platforms to compete for
consumers on side i, an increase in sj decreases the threshold requirement of the level of
network externalities for overturning the U-shaped pricing on side i, e¯. Interestingly, all these
cross-group effects of switching costs are absent from Armstrong’s and Klemperer’s models.
Notice that the indirect bargain works through consumers’ anticipation about their second-
period utility, but it does not change firms’ anticipation. To see this, consider a variant of
the basic model, where consumers and platforms have different discount factors, and network
externalities are time-dependent, that is, eA = eB = e1 in the first period and eA = eB = e2 in
the second period. Consequently, the first-period prices become
pi0,1 = 1 −e1︸︷︷︸
Armstrong (2006a)
+
2
3
(δis
2
i − δF si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Klemperer (1987b)
− δi
3(1− e22)
(e22s
2
i + e2sisj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect bargain
.
Clearly, the firm anticipation effect −2δF si/3 does not depend on e. The reason is that given
first-period market shares, the effect of switching costs on second-period prices do not depend
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on network externalities, which can be seen from the second-period equilibrium outcome in
Proposition 1:
pi0,2 = 1− e2 +
si
3
(2ni0,1 − 1).
In addition, we can see that the indirect bargain depends only on e2 but not on e1.
Taken together, the results of (ii) and (iii) show that we cannot simply add up the bargain
effects of switching costs and network externalities as combined together they will lead to
an even bigger price reduction than the sum of price reductions in pure switching cost and
pure two-sided models. This is complementary to the literature because it provides a formal
explanation for the mechanism through which the interactions of esi and esisj work.
Part (iv) shows that stronger network externalities not only intensify price competition
directly as in Armstrong (2006a), but they also lead to an increase in the indirect bargain effect,
which further pushes down the first-period prices. This also explains why there is a threshold
value for e above which the standard U shape ceases to hold: since the indirect bargain is a
monotone function of e, adding it to the standard U-shaped direct bargain initially flattens the
U shape when externalities are weak, but as externalities become stronger, the indirect bargain
effect eventually dominates and results in the first-period prices decreasing in s.
3 Profits and Managerial Implications
I now turn to the effect of switching costs on profits. In the platform-symmetric equilibrium,
the two platforms share consumers on each side equally, that is, nA0,1 = n
B
0,1 = 1/2. Therefore,
the expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 =
1
2
pA0,1 +
1
2
pB0,1 + δpi0,2,
where pi0,2 is the second-period profit.
Corollary 3. There exists a threshold eˆ = (
√
s2j + 8 − sj)/4 ∈ (0, 1) such that, if network
externalities are weak (e < eˆ), the total profit of each platform pi0 is U-shaped in switching
costs si, whereas if network externalities are strong (e ≥ eˆ), pi0 decreases with si. Furthermore,
pi0 always decreases with e.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Since the profit in the second period, pi0,2, is not affected by switching costs in equilibrium,
it is clear that the comparative statics of profits with respect to switching costs and that of
first-period prices with respect to switching costs analyzed in Proposition 3 work in the same
direction. Similarly, with respect to network externalities, the comparative statics on profits
is closely related to that on first-period prices performed in Proposition 3 except that network
externalities have an additional effect on second-period prices. Given pi0,2 = 1− e (as shown in
Proposition 2), it is clear that stronger network externalities always reduce the total profits of
a platform because they intensify price competition in both periods.
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In the following discussion I focus on the case where e is large enough.16 As in Klemperer
(1987b), switching costs do not affect the second-period profit of the platform, but they lead
to a decrease in overall profits because the presence of market power over locked-in customers
intensifies price competition in the first period. More interestingly, I identify a new channel—
the indirect bargain—through which switching costs can further reduce overall profits. In
particular, there are three ways in which the indirect bargain can affect profits: First, network
externalities together with switching costs weaken the consumer anticipation effect because
consumers value participation on the other side. This effect distinguishes this model from
that of Armstrong (2006a) because such an effect is absent from his model, and from that of
Klemperer (1987b) because the consumer anticipation effect goes in the opposite direction. As
a result, switching costs on side i intensify price competition on side i (see (ii) of Proposition
3). The second effect of the indirect bargain, which is absent from both Armstrong (2006a)
and Klemperer (1987b), is that higher switching costs on side i also lead to more competitive
behavior on side j because capturing more consumers on side j is a cheaper way to build
market share on side i. Side i consumers are harder to attract as they have strong incentives
to avoid being locked-in and thus paying large switching costs in the second period (see (iii) of
Proposition 3). Third, profits are decreasing in network externalities, as network externalities
not only have their own direct effect of intensifying price competition as in Armstrong (2006a)
but also have an indirect effect of strengthening the indirect bargain (see (iv) of Proposition
3). Thus, the combination of switching costs and network externalities can decrease overall
profits more dramatically than can each of these ingredients alone.
This result can be useful for thinking about managerial policies in platform markets such
as that for smartphone and video games, where switching costs are present on both sides. In
the smartphone market, switching from Apple’s iOS to Google’s Android system, application
developers need to re-code their programs for different interfaces, as well as to create additional
support and maintenance, whereas application users need to migrate and re-purchase their
applications. In the video games market, switching from Sony’s PlayStation to Windows’ Xbox,
gamers need to re-learn how to use the controller and lose the progress of their games, whereas
developers have to buy a separate development kit to create games for different consoles. Since
both switching costs and network externalities reduce platforms’ overall profits, it would be
desirable for platforms to lower either or both of them. Let us explore each of these strategies
in turn.
In terms of reducing switching costs, platforms can provide guides on how to make a switch
across platforms, and introduce apps and services that help data migration, thereby allowing
users to access the same media content across platforms (e.g., Google Play Movies & TV on
iTunes and cloud computing technology). Moreover, instead of interpreting switching costs
simply as transaction costs and learning costs brought about by moving to another platform,
one can think of them as measures of backward compatibility without changing the qualita-
tive results. More specifically, when technologies are completely backward compatible, there
is no additional cost of staying with the same platform. However, when technologies are only
16When e is small, profits are U-shaped in switching costs, for similar reasons described in part (i) of
Proposition 3.
15
partially backward compatible, staying with the same platform creates an additional cost of
backward incompatibility. One can incorporate these additional costs in this model by rein-
terpreting switching costs as the difference between the cost of migration across platforms and
the cost of backward compatibility when staying with one platform. Thus, a reduction in
switching costs may also mean offering new versions of products being less compatible with
older versions.17
In terms of reducing network externalities, platforms can introduce more valuable services
and functionalities that are not available on other platforms. This has two effects: first, the
stand-alone value becomes more important relative to the network benefits; second, as the
more valuable services are now integrated with the platform, this lowers the average value of
the network benefits that consumers can derive from other services. These two effects taken
together decrease the value of network effects. In reality, this fits with Microsoft’s recent
strategy of integrating its services such as Azure, Cortana, Office, and Xbox more deeply with
its own operating system,18 as well as Apple’s strategy of integrating its OS X Yosemite on Mac
and iOS on iPhones more closely, both of which aim at improving the value of their services
relative to their rivals’.
4 Welfare and Policy Implications
In the previous sections, I examined the effect of switching costs on prices and profits in the
presence of network externalities. Because of the indirect bargain, the overall effect of switching
costs on prices is not simply the sum of effects of switching costs and network externalities
individually. Rather, the overall effect exceeds this sum. One should, therefore, be cautious
about how to evaluate the impact of these two ingredients on consumer and social welfare also,
both of which I discuss below. It is useful to keep in mind that the whole analysis has been
carried out under the assumption that the market is fully covered and consumers have inelastic
demand. First consider social welfare:
Proposition 4. Social welfare decreases with switching costs.
Proof. The first-period social welfare is constant in switching costs, while the second-period
welfare is decreasing in switching costs. More specifically, the second-period welfare loss is the
sum of two deadweight losses:
2[ (
1− si
2
)si︸ ︷︷ ︸
DWL from switchers
+
s2i
4︸︷︷︸
DWL from non−switchers
],
which is increasing in si.
17Notice, however, that there may be other forms of backward compatibility that are not covered here. For
example, when there are different generations of consumers, backward compatibility may mean later generations
benefiting from earlier generations through network effects, but this form of compatibility is not included here,
because there is no cross-generation network effect.
18In particular, the new Windows 10 allows users’ data to integrate more smoothly from phones and tablets
to PC’s and Xbox game consoles.
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The first-period social welfare is constant in switching costs because all consumers buy one
unit of good, the size of the two groups is fixed, and the whole market is served. There are no
demand-expansion and demand-reduction effects of switching costs as the total demand is fixed.
However, the second-period welfare is decreasing in switching costs. The second-period welfare
loss is the sum of two deadweight losses. Considering consumers who have previously bought
from platform 0, those whose tastes change a lot will switch to platform 1 with probability
(1−si)/2 and each pays si; those whose tastes change a little will continue to buy from platform
0 even though they prefer platform 1, which happens with probability si/2 and each suffers
an average loss of mismatch with an inferior product si/2.
19 A similar distortion arises for
consumers who have previously bought from platform 1, and for both groups of consumers.
Another welfare criterion concerns consumer surplus:
Proposition 5. In the symmetric case of ei = e, si = s and δi = δF = δ, i ∈ {A,B}, if
network externalities are strong (e ≥ 3/7), consumer surplus is higher with switching costs
than without. However, if network externalities are weak (e < 3/7), there exists a threshold
sˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that consumer surplus is higher with switching costs than without for small
switching costs (s < sˆ), and consumer surplus is lower for larger switching costs (s ≥ sˆ).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Although switching costs lower social welfare, consumers may enjoy a net gain when the
benefit from a lower first-period price is larger than the sum of the two deadweight losses.
This is especially true when network externalities are strong: the indirect bargain weakens the
standard consumer anticipation effect in Klemperer’s result and may even reverse it, and it
further decreases the first-period price through the interaction between switching costs and
network externalities, which is in addition to the direct effect of network externalities as in
Armstrong’s result.
However, although total consumer surplus increases with switching costs under strong net-
work externalities, higher switching costs may hurt some consumers. More specifically, consider
consumers who have purchased from platform 0 in the first period, and suppose that there is
an increase in s by ∆s. Consumers can then be categorized into three types according to the
impact of such an increase on them. First, consumers whose second-period preference falls into
the interval of [0, 1/2 + s/2) do not switch before and after the increase, and therefore benefit
from a decrease in the first-period prices. Second, consumers whose second-period preference
falls into the interval of [1/2 + (s + ∆s)/2, 1] indeed switch, and they have to balance the
benefit from lower first-period prices against the cost of switching. Third, consumers whose
second-period preference falls into the interval of (1/2 + s/2, 1/2 + (s + ∆s)/2) do not switch
but would have switched if there were no increase in s. For these consumers, they enjoy the
benefits of lower first-period prices, but because they are stuck with their first-period choice,
19The gain in better match is not relevant to the analysis of the effect of switching costs on social welfare
because such gain is not affected by switching costs. To see why, suppose that there are no switching costs,
consumers can switch if they prefer, and thus get a better match of product with their tastes. Suppose now that
switching costs are positive, consumers who switch will still gain from a better match. On the contrary, the
loss in mismatch is affected by switching costs, as switching costs may prevent some consumers from switching.
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they also incur a cost of product mismatch, which is equal to the value of switching cost s.
More formally, for the latter two categories of consumers, the marginal benefit of raising s is
∂∆p
∂s
=
2(1− e2) + 2(3e2 + e− 2)s
3(1− e2) ,
which can be obtained by differentiating the benefit of price reduction associated with an
increase in s with respect to s (the details of these calculations are given in Appendix E),
whereas the marginal cost is ds/ds = 1. Thus, they are indeed worse off following an increase
in s if
2s(3e2 + e− 2) < 1− e2.
This model thus provides two general policy rules in two-sided markets with switching
costs. First, policymakers need to consider demand interdependencies more carefully, especially
because they will affect how the indirect bargain works. However, since most of the theoretical
models that study the welfare effects of switching costs rely on the assumption that the market
is one-sided (see Section 2.9 in Farrell and Klemperer (2007)), they are generally not applicable
to studying two-sided markets. Many papers in the two-sided literature, for instance, Wright
(2004) and Evans and Schmalensee (2014), have pointed out that various policies (without
focusing on switching costs) that apply one-sided results to two-sided markets are prone to
commit errors. The analysis here is complementary to their view. In particular, I show that
in the presence of switching costs, demands can be interdependent in two ways: through the
direct effect of network externalities, which is the traditional channel in the two-sided literature,
and through the indirect effect of network externalities in changing the way prices respond to
switching costs, which is the main novelty of this paper. Further, because of this indirect
effect, the switching costs of one group of consumers can affect the prices of another group (as
shown in Proposition 3), and in addition, switching costs can be less harmful to consumers in
a market with network externalities than in a market without network externalities (as shown
in Proposition 5). Hence, policymakers should be cautious about consumer protection policies
that reduce switching costs in two-sided markets. For instance, because it is common to have
bargains-then-ripoffs pricing in one-sided markets with switching costs, attractive introductory
offers may call for consumer protection policies that lower switching costs in later periods. In
two-sided markets, however, the lowering of switching costs of one group will unambiguously
raise the first-period price of the other group, and such a change will benefit consumers on one
side while making consumers on the other side worse off. Moreover, even within one group of
consumers, when network externalities are strong, it is possible that lowering switching costs
may hurt some consumers (especially the non-switchers) because of the increase in first-period
prices. Accurate welfare analysis should account for these cross-group and within-group effects
associated with switching costs and network effects.
Second, policymakers need to evaluate carefully the size of the indirect bargain. This paper
derives new insights on the bargain effect of switching costs: I show in Proposition 3 that the
interaction between switching costs and network externalities may lead to a yet bigger bargain
effect of switching costs than the sum of effects in traditional models. Policies should avoid
mechanical analysis of simply adding up the effects of switching costs and network externalities
because this may overestimate the extent to which switching costs can reduce welfare.
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From a broader perspective, these rules also apply to compatibility policy as we can eas-
ily interpret switching costs as the difference between the cost of migration across platforms
and the cost of backward compatibility when staying with one platform, as mentioned in the
previous section. Hence, a parallel policy conclusion would be that more compatibility across
different versions of one platform’s products could be more beneficial to consumers in the
presence of network externalities, because an increase in switching costs may mean reducing
the compatibility between the products of different platforms or increasing the compatibility
between the products of one platform.
5 Extensions
In the model discussed so far, consumers are farsighted and their preferences are independent
across periods: what will happen if some consumers care only about their utility in the current
period (myopic) and some has unchanged preferences (loyal)? Moreover, the main analysis
is based on a single-homing model but this is not the only market configuration in reality.
One may consider the case where one group single-homes while the other group joins both
(commonly termed as “competitive bottlenecks”). It might also be interesting to explore the
consequences of asymmetric compatibility between platforms’ products, and price discrimina-
tion between old consumers of one platform and new consumers from the other platform. In
this section, I discuss these extensions in turn, and examine the conditions under which the
indirect bargain remains valid.
5.1 Other Forms of Consumer Heterogeneity
Let us first extend the model to incorporate other forms of consumer heterogeneity. Specifically,
a consumer can now be one of four types: he can be either farsighted or myopic, and be
either loyal or disloyal. Farsighted consumers on side i behave as in the basic model: they
make decisions based on their lifetime utility and discount the second-period utility at rate δi.
Myopic consumers on side i make decisions based on their first-period utility, and therefore
have a discount factor δi = 0. Disloyal consumers, as in the basic model, have independent
preferences across periods and can switch to another platform at a cost of si. Loyal consumers
do not switch. Their preference, which is represented by their location on the Hotelling line,
does not change across the two periods, and hence in the second period, they always stay with
the same platform from which they have purchased in the first period.20
On each side, a proportion αi of the consumers is myopic, while 1 − αi of them is far-
sighted.21 Moreover, a consumer is loyal with probability µi, and has independent preferences
20Klemperer (1987b) makes a similar assumption, but he assumes that those consumers, who have unchanged
preferences, respond to prices in both periods, so his consumers are not exactly “loyal” in the sense of this
paper.
21This is different from Klemperer (1987b) because he does not consider the possibility of having a mixture
of myopic and farsighted consumers. That is, his consumers are either all myopic or all farsighted.
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with probability 1 − µi.22 Both αi and µi are common knowledge among platforms and con-
sumers,23 but in the first period, consumers do not learn their realized switching costs for the
second period.24 The timing of this modified game is as follows:
• At the beginning of the first period, consumers are unattached to any platforms. They
learn their initial preferences. Platforms set the first-period prices. Consumers choose
which platform to join.
• At the beginning of the second period, consumers learn their switching costs (and hence
their loyalty). If indeed consumers are not loyal, they also learn their second-period
preferences. Platforms set the second-period prices. Consumers decide to switch or not.
The equilibrium of this game is derived in Appendix F. Similar to the basic model, the existence
of the symmetric equilibrium requires that platforms’ profits are concave, there is no profitable
deviation from the equilibrium prices both on and off the equilibrium path, and in addition, it
requires that there is no profitable deviation for platforms to serve only their loyal customers.
First, consider the case where consumers are myopic.25 The effect of switching costs on
prices and welfare are as follows.
Proposition 6. In a model with myopic consumers (δi = 0 and αi = 1), independent prefer-
ences µi = 0, and symmetric externalities ei = e and switching costs si = s, i ∈ {A,B}, the
first-period price is given by
pi0,1 = 1− e−
2
3
δF s.
The first-period price pi0,1 is decreasing in s, social welfare is decreasing in s, and consumer
surplus is increasing in s, regardless of the level of network externalities e.
Proof. See Appendix G
Myopic consumers do not anticipate that a first-period price cut will lead to a second-
period price rise, and will therefore react more responsively to price cut in the first period.
This increases the incentives of platforms to compete for myopic consumers. This result is
broadly consistent with that of von Weizsa¨cker (1984) and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason and
22Ruiz-Aliseda (2013) shows that the assumption of independent preferences may have unintended conse-
quences of price competition in the second period ending up being too soft. The presence of loyal consumers
here relaxes such an assumption. This could also support the fact that in practice not all consumers have
changing preferences.
23Myopia is therefore defined as consumers ignoring the link between their utility in the two periods, even
though they observe prices set by both platforms, and αi and µi.
24This means that loyalty depends on switching costs and, in particular, s is drawn from a two-point distri-
bution, where s is small with probability 1− µ, and s is big with probability µ.
25A straightforward interpretation of myopic consumers is that these consumers only care about their utility
in the current period. Or, alternatively, this could be interpreted as “new” consumers, who are different in
every period. For example, a company buys some software for their workers in the first period. Some workers
leave the company in the second period, and purchase their own software. These workers have a switching cost
of learning the new software product that is different from that purchased by their former company, but the
company will not take into consideration such a switching cost when making its purchase in the first period.
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Netz (2000). They show, for example, that if consumers expect that a firm’s price cut is
more permanent than their tastes, which can be interpreted as consumers being myopic, then
switching costs tend to lower prices.
In addition, this result illustrates that the indirect bargain affects prices only through
consumer anticipation: when all consumers are myopic (and hence there is no consumer an-
ticipation), the indirect bargain fully disappears, and the first-period price is indeed the sum
of the effect in Armstrong (2006a) and that in Klemperer (1987b). Therefore, the indirect
bargain effect remains valid as long as not all consumers are myopic.
Switching costs reduce social welfare because of the two types of deadweight costs borne
by the switchers and the non-switchers, who suffer a mismatch between the product and their
tastes, as mentioned before.26 Compared to the case where consumers are farsighted (more
precisely, Proposition 5), what is different here is that consumer surplus is always increasing
in switching costs regardless of the level of network externalities. The reason is that myopia
weakens the consumer anticipation effect, which increases the platforms’ incentives for cutting
prices, which in turn increases consumer surplus.
On the other hand, when all consumers are farsighted, but some of them are loyal, the
indirect bargain is always present.27 In particular,
Proposition 7. In a model with loyal and farsighted consumers (µi > 0 and αi = 0) and
symmetric externalities ei = e, i ∈ {A,B}, there exists a threshold e˜ > e¯ such that the first-
period price pi0,1 is decreasing in switching costs si if network externalities are sufficiently strong
(e ≥ e˜).
Proof. See Appendix H.
Hence, the indirect bargain effect is unchanged and the first-period prices can still be de-
creasing in switching costs, provided that network externalities are strong enough.28 Moreover,
Propositions 3, 6, and 7 together highlight a new explanation for aggressive pricing behavior
in two-sided markets. In particular, the strategy of lowering price is not simply due to network
externalities, a view that is central to the work of Rochet and Tirole [2003] and Armstrong
[2006a], but also depends on switching costs (as shown in Proposition 3) and the characteristics
of these consumers (as shown in Propositions 6 and 7).
26Myopia itself does not affect social welfare, because when myopic consumer preferences do not change, they
make the right product choice and do not switch. When myopic consumer preferences change, switchers have
to bear switching costs; and some of the non-switchers are forced into buying an inferior product that does not
match their tastes. Hence, the only thing that matters is whether consumer preferences change or not.
27Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992) also explore the consequences of heterogeneity in consumer brand
loyalty, but they consider the pricing strategy of a monopoly incumbent, who anticipates the entry of a rival in
the subsequent period, and focus on the effect of loyalty on entry, which is a different issue from this model.
28When e < e˜, the first-period price is U-shaped in switching costs as long as µ is small enough (e.g., when
µ < 1/2); otherwise, the first-period price could increase with switching costs when there are too many loyal
consumers. This is because loyal consumers are farsighted. They expect that a price cut today will be followed
by a price rise tomorrow, and such a price rise is larger with loyal consumers than without. As shown in
Appendix F, the second-period equilibrium price here is pi0,2 =
1−ej(1−µi)
1−µi , which is larger than the price in
a model without loyal consumers, pi = 1 − ej . This makes the demand of loyal consumers even more price
inelastic, which in turn increases the incentives for raising prices in the first period.
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Another interesting issue arises when we reinterpret 1 − µi as the probability of being
“ignorant” instead of being “disloyal”. In this extension, all consumers know their initial
preference before their first-period purchase. While loyal consumers always know their first-
and second-period tastes, disloyal consumers, given that their tastes change randomly in the
second period, only learn their second-period taste after their first-period purchase. We can
then reinterpret µi as the fraction of consumers who know their preference, while 1 − µi as
the remaining consumers who do not know theirs. The latter are ignorant consumers, who
receive a random signal about their first-period taste at the beginning of the period and only
discover their true taste after consuming the product. In this case, all consumer locations on
the line are fixed across periods, but the previous results remain valid provided that the signal
received by the ignorant consumers is uniformly distributed. Since the cutoff threshold of e in
Proposition 7 above which prices are no longer a U shape but instead a decreasing function
of switching costs, e˜, is larger than that in Proposition 3, e¯, an increase in µi makes it less
likely that the first-period price is decreasing in switching costs. This, in turn, suggests that it
can be profitable for platforms to provide more information about their products in order to
enhance consumers’ understanding of their own preferences.
5.2 Competitive Bottlenecks
This model can be extended to the case of competitive bottlenecks. Suppose that side A
continues to single-home, while side B may multi-home. The competitive bottleneck framework
is typical in markets such as computer operating systems, and online air ticket and hotel
bookings. In the operating system market, users use a single OS, Windows OS, Apple’s Mac OS
X platform or Linux-based OS, while engineers write software for different OS. In the market
for online travel booking, consumers rely on one comparison site such as skyscanner.com,
lastminute.com or booking.com, but airlines and hotels join multiple platforms in order to gain
access to each comparison site’s customers. Since side B can join both platforms, switching
costs and loyalty on this side are not relevant, so that sB, µB = 0.
29 Thus, a benchmark for
comparison to the prices in the multi-homing model would be the case where sB, µB = 0 but
both sides single-home. It follows from Proposition 2 that
Corollary 4. In the single-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally patient
(δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0), independent preferences µi = 0, i ∈ {A,B}, and side B does not
incur any switching costs (sB = 0), switching costs on one side sA do not affect the first-period
29Note that the concept of multi-homing is not compatible with switching costs in the current framework. I use
two examples to illustrate. First, think of the smartphone market. If the option to multi-home means consumers
are able to use both iPhone and Android systems, then it is not reasonable to impose an additional learning
cost on them if they switch platform. Another example is the media market. If multi-homing means that
advertisers are free to put ads on either or both platforms, then it does not make sense to impose an additional
switching cost on these advertisers. One may argue that we can distinguish between learning switching costs
(incurred only at a switch to a new supplier) and transactional switching costs (incurred at every switch), as
in Nilssen (1992), but switching costs are not relevant on the multi-homing side because learning costs and
transaction costs are equivalent in a two-period model. This also explains why it is not useful to consider the
case in which both sides multi-home.
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price on the other side pB,sh0,1 , where sh denotes prices in the single-homing model. That is,
pB,sh0,1 = 1− eA.
The intuition is that since preferences of consumers on side B in the two periods are
unrelated and they do not have switching costs, every period’s choice is independent. This
means that the first-period price is not affected by that in the second period. Consequently,
although side A’s switching costs affect side B’s second-period price in the subgame equilibrium,
it does not affect side B’s first-period price.
The main difference between the multi-homing and the single-homing model lies in the
market share of consumers on side B, which can be described as follows. In period t, t ∈ {1, 2},
a consumer on side B located at θB0,t is indifferent between buying and not buying from platform
0 if
vB + eBn
A
0,t − θB0,t − pB0,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB0,t = vB + eBn
A
0,t − pB0,t.
Similarly, a consumer on side B located at θB1,t is indifferent between buying and not buying
from platform 1 if
vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− (1− θB1,t)− pB1,t = 0,
which can be simplified to
θB1,t = vB + eB(1− nA0,t)− pB1,t.
We solve the game by backward induction as before, and consider symmetric equilibrium
(see Appendix I for its existence conditions). Then, we can derive the equilibrium prices.
Proposition 8. In the multi-homing model, with all consumers and both platforms equally
patient (δi = δF = δ > 0 and αi = 0), independent preferences µi = 0, and symmetric
externalities ei = e > 0, i ∈ {A,B},
i. For the single-homing consumers, if network externalities are weak (e <
√
1/2), the first-
period price pA,mh0,1 is U-shaped in switching costs sA, whereas if network externalities are
strong (e ≥√1/2), pA,mh0,1 is decreasing in sA.
ii. The first period price of the multi-homing consumers pB,mh0,1 = vB/2 does not depend on
switching costs sA or network externalities e.
iii. First-period prices tend to be higher on the multi-homing side and lower on the single-
homing side with respect to the single-homing model in Corollary 4 if the market is fully
covered (that is, e+ vB/2 > 1), where mh denotes prices in the multi-homing model.
Proof. See Appendix I.
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Part (i) implies that for single-homing consumers stronger externalities make it more likely
that first-period equilibrium prices decrease with switching costs, which is consistent with
Proposition 3 in the single-homing model.30
As for multi-homing consumers, part (ii) shows that switching costs do not affect the price
paid by them. Even though switching costs of the single-homing consumers can in principle
affect the second-period price of the multi-homing consumers through network externalities,
there is no connection between the second-period and first-period prices of the multi-homing
consumers, because for them, each period’s choice is independent due to their independent
preferences and the lack of switching costs. Notice that although this intuition is similar to
that of Corollary 4, pB,mh0,1 ≥ pB,sh0,1 , as will be explained below. Moreover, the price of the multi-
homing side is not sensitive to network externalities because with multi-homing, consumers
on both sides can always interact with each other, and this eliminates the impact of network
externalities on prices.
Part (iii) further compares the prices in the multi-homing case to that in the single-homing
case. Since side B multi-homes, there is no competition between the two platforms to attract
this group. Compared to the single-homing case with sB, µB = 0, the higher first-period price
faced by the multi-homing side is a consequence of each platform having monopoly power over
this side, and the large revenue is used in the form of lower first-period prices to convince the
single-homing side to join the platform.
Regarding welfare, as the prices of the multi-homing consumers do not depend on switching
costs, the welfare effect of switching costs is determined solely by their effect on single-homing
consumers. Therefore, as in Propositions 4 and 5, social welfare is decreasing in switching
costs, and consumer welfare may be increasing in switching costs, depending on the benefits of
price reduction in the first period and the deadweight losses associated with switching costs.31
5.3 Asymmetric Compatibility
Let us now consider competition between platforms of products with asymmetric compatibility:
the cost of switching from platform 0 to 1, denoted s0, is different from the cost of switching
from platform 1 to 0, denoted s1. In the smartphone market, whereas most iPhones cater for
the high-end market, some of the Samsung Android phones are more affordable and cover the
lower end of the spectrum. Can we attribute the difference in the pricing of devices between
Apple and Samsung to the fact that Apple has successfully built an ecosystem that makes it
hard for users to switch?
In this case, the platform-symmetric equilibrium would no longer exist because the plat-
forms become asymmetric. Therefore, in each period, instead of having two different prices
in equilibrium, we have four, which makes the analysis less tractable. I consider the follow-
ing numerical example to illustrate how asymmetric compatibility influences the equilibrium
30Notice that the threshold value of e above which the U shape disappears is larger in this case than that in
Proposition 3 (that is, e¯ ≤√1/2). This is because here, there are no switching costs on the multi-homing side
that intensify price competition on the single-homing side.
31If there is quality choice as in Anderson et al. (2015), then welfare effects are less clear-cut: a platform’s
investment in quality may change depending on whether multi-homing is allowed.
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pricing: δA = δB = δF = 0.8, µA = µB = 0, eA = eB = 0.8, s1 = 0.5, and s0 ∈ [0, 1].32 In
addition, assume that only consumers on side A bear switching costs, and that all consumers
single-home. In Figure 1, I illustrate the equilibrium pricing of the platforms on side A. The
analysis of the effects of switching costs on side B is irrelevant for similar reasons in Corollary
4.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Pricing with Asymmetric Compatibility.
Panel (a) presents the first-period pricing on side A, and panel (b) shows the second-period
pricing on side A as functions of switching costs s0. Pricing of platform 0 is shown with a solid
line, and that of platform 1 is drawn as a dotted line. It is shown that if s0 < s1, platform
1 charges a lower price than platform 0 in the first period, but a higher price in the second
period. The intuitive reason is that since platform 1 is relatively more expensive to switch
away from in the second period, it is willing to charge a lower price in the first period in order
to acquire more customers whom it can exploit later. On the contrary, if s0 > s1, platform 1,
knowing that consumers will easily switch away tomorrow, will raise its price today.
5.4 Behavior-Based Price Discrimination
Finally, I extend the basic model, where consumers are farsighted and have independent prefer-
ences across periods, by allowing platforms to price discriminate based on consumers’ purchase
history. The difference is that in the second period, instead of setting one price on each side,
a platform can set two prices depending on whether the consumer has purchased from it or
from the other platform in the first period. To be more specific, in the second period, on
side i, platform 0 charges p0,i0,2 to its own past customers, and p
1,i
0,2 to new customers who have
bought from platform 1 in the first period. As for the first period, platforms charge the same
price to all consumers on each side because there is no purchase history available. The game
32Notice that e = 0.8 >
√
1/2, which is the threshold for e above which the U shape disappears in Proposition
3 (the platform-symmetric case with sj = 0). And even in this platform-asymmetric case, the U shape does
not reappear, which means that the indirect bargain effect is still at work. However, when e is very large (such
as e→ 1), tipping occurs and an interior solution does not exist anymore.
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proceeds as in the basic model, and we solve for the platform-symmetric equilibrium, which
can be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 9. Suppose that ei = e, si = s, and δi = δF = δ, i ∈ {A,B}. When third-degree
price discrimination is feasible, in the platform-symmetric equilibrium, the first-period prices
are given by
pi0,1 = p
i
1,1 = 1− e+
2δ
3
(s2 − s)− δ
3
s2[2 +
e
3(1− e) ],
and the second period-prices are given by
p0,i0,2 = p
1,i
1,2 = 1− e+
s
3
, p1,i0,2 = p
0,i
1,2 = 1− e−
s
3
.
Proof. See Appendix J.
The indirect bargain is now given by
δ
3
s2[2 +
e
3(1− e) ],
which is still increasing in network externalities. Thus, the key intuitions on the indirect bar-
gain in the basic model are unchanged. The difference is that when price discrimination is
feasible, the U shape in Proposition 3 disappears, and the first-period prices are always de-
creasing in switching costs regardless of the level of network externalities. This is because price
discrimination intensifies competition in the first period, which is a standard result in one-sided
markets without network externalities.33 Moreover, in the second period, since the discrimina-
tory prices do not depend on first-period market shares, higher switching costs always increase
the price for a platform’s own past customers and decrease the price for its rival’s customers.
However, although switching costs have distributional effects across old and new consumers
under price discrimination, it has no effect on the total welfare in the second period because
each platform serves half of the consumers on each side in the symmetric equilibrium. More
importantly, these results in both the first and second periods show that even if we allow for
price discrimination, the main conclusion that switching costs can be less harmful to consumers
on average in the presence of network externalities carries through. Thus, policymakers should
worry less about switching costs in two-sided markets that exhibit strong network externalities,
and this advice remains valid whether or not we allow the prices within each group to vary.
6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized the equilibrium pricing strategy of platforms competing in two-
sided markets with switching costs, which can be applied to a wide range of industries, ranging
from traditional industries such as shopping malls and credit cards to high-tech industries
such as smartphones and video games. The main contribution is that it has provided a useful
33See Armstrong (2006b) for a survey of the relevant literature.
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model for generalizing, and extending beyond, the traditional results in the switching cost and
the two-sided literature. In line with earlier research, there are some conditions under which
the first-period price is U-shaped in switching costs (a` la Klemperer); and prices tend to be
lower on the side that exerts stronger externalities (a` la Armstrong). However, this model also
provides new insights by proving that in a dynamic two-sided market—as opposed to a merely
static one—under strong network externalities, the standard U-shaped result does not emerge
and the first-period price always decreases with switching costs. This is due to the existence
of the indirect bargain effect of switching costs that does not emerge in either Armstrong’s or
Klemperer’s models. Recognizing the importance of this additional effect is critical for ensuring
that consumer protection policies do not cause unintended consequence of reducing consumer
welfare by causing more harm to some consumers than good to the other.
The literature on the interaction between switching costs and network externalities is rela-
tively thin and does not provide a solid basis for evaluating their effects. This paper is a first
attempt at analyzing the impact of such interaction, but much work remains to be done: First,
this paper has taken switching costs as an exogenous feature of the market. Future research
could consider endogenous switching costs. Second, this paper has focused on a two-period
model, and it would be useful to understand the extent to which the results carry over to a
multi-period model. Finally, this paper has explored consumer heterogeneity such as loyalty
and farsightedness, but one can think of other forms of heterogeneity. For example, within-
group switching costs may be different between the technologically advanced customers and
the less advanced ones. Within-group externalities may also be different: youngsters use ap-
plications more heavily, and therefore care more about network externalities than their older
counterparts, many of whom only use their smartphones for phone calls and text messages.
However, including these forms of heterogeneity will complicate the analysis considerably.34
The current model captures a lot of ingredients in reality, yet is sufficiently tractable to al-
low for a complete characterization of the equilibrium. This seems to be a reasonable first
step to contribute to a literature that has not fully explored the consequences of consumer
heterogeneity.
Appendices
A Second Period Equilibrium
Solving for nA0,2 and n
B
0,2 in Equation (2) simultaneously, we obtain the second-period market
shares as follows:
ni0,2 =
γ + βi + (p
i
1,2 − pi0,2) + ei(pj1,2 − pj0,2)
2γ
,
34See Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) for a model with heterogeneous network effects, where platforms can
also price discriminate, but with no switching costs.
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where
γ =1− eAeB,
βi =(2n
i
0,1 − 1)si + (2nj0,1 − 1)eisj.
Because ei < 1, we have γ > 0.
Substituting the market shares into the profit function in Equation (1), and differentiating
it with respect to the prices, we obtain the following equations:
∂pi0,2
∂pi0,2
= ni0,2 −
pi0,2
2γ
− p
j
0,2
2γ
ej,
∂pi1,2
∂pi1,2
= 1− ni0,2 −
pi1,2
2γ
− p
j
1,2
2γ
ej.
Solving the system of first-order conditions, one finds the following second-period equilib-
rium prices:
pi0,2 = 1− ej +
ηiλisi + iλjsj
∆
, (A.1)
pi1,2 = 1− ej −
ηiλisi + iλjsj
∆
,
where
∆ = 9− (eA + 2eB)(eB + 2eA) > 0,
λi = 2n
i
0,1 − 1,
ηi = 3− ej(ej + 2ei) > 0,
i = ei − ej.
A.1 Proof of Corollary 1
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to si, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂si
= sign(ni0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂si
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂si
.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
Differentiate Equation (A.1) with respect to sj, we have
sign
∂pi0,2
∂sj
= sign(ei − ej)(nj0,1 −
1
2
),
∂pi0,2
∂sj
=− ∂p
i
1,2
∂sj
.
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B First Period Equilibrium
The market share of platform 0 on side i in the first period (i.e., the indifferent consumer) is
given by
ni0,1 = θ
i
R =
1
2
+
ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δisi [(ei+2ej)λjsj+(3−∆)λisi]∆
2
.
Solving simultaneously for nA0,1 and n
B
0,1, we obtain:
ni0,1 =
1
2
+
ei(1− κjs2j)(pi1,1 − pi0,1) + (ei + σisisj)(pj1,1 − pj0,1)
2[(1− κis2i )(1− κjs2j)− (ei + σisisj)(ej + σjsjsi)]
,
where
κi =
δi(3−∆)
∆
,
σi =
δi(ei + 2ej)
∆
.
The expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 = p
A
0,1n
A
0,1 + p
B
0,1n
B
0,1 + δFpi0,2.
The first-order conditions for maximizing pi0 with respect to p
A
0,1 and p
B
0,1 are given as follows:
∂pi0
∂pi0,1
= ni0,1 − pi0,1
(1− κjs2j)
2ϕ
− pj0,1
(ej + σjsjsi)
2ϕ
+ δF
[
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
∂ni0,1
∂pi0,1
+
∂pi0,2
∂nj0,1
∂nj0,1
∂pi0,1
]
where
ϕ =(1− κis2i )(1− κjs2j)− (ei + σisisj)(ej + σjsjsi),
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
=
[
6
∆
+
(ei − ej)− (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)
∆
]
si
def
= ξisi.
Similarly, there are two first-order conditions for platform 1.
In the platform-symmetric equilibrium, where pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 = p
A and pB0,1 = p
B
1,1 = p
B, the
sufficient condition for platform k’s profit being concave in its prices is as follows:35
1− κAs2A > eA + σAsAsB > 0; 1− κBs2B > eB + σBsBsA > 0. (B.1)
In the symmetric equilibrium, the first-period equilibrium prices for side A and side B are
given respectively by
pA0,1 = 1− eB − κAs2A − σBsBsA − δF ξAsA; pB0,1 = 1− eA − κBs2B − σAsAsB − δF ξBsB, (B.2)
and the second-period equilibrium prices are given by
pA0,2 = 1− eB; pB0,2 = 1− eA.
35Notice that when si = 0, we obtain the same existence condition for the symmetric equilibrium as in
Armstrong (2006a). That is, Equation (B.1) here is analogous to Equation (8) in Armstrong (2006a). However,
I show that the equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameters and, in particular, when si > 0.
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To ensure that the above prices are indeed the equilibrium, we need vi to be big enough
such that the market is covered; there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium prices
both on and off the equilibrium path, that is,
vi > 2(1− ej) + 1− ei. (B.3)
Second, we need to show that both platforms are active in the second period out of the
equilibrium path. In particular, this requires that the second-period profit is non-negative even
for the platform without any customer in the first period, that is,
pi0,2(n
i
0,1 = 0, n
j
0,1 = 0) ≥ 0. (B.4)
Notice that all these conditions hold even when some parameters on the two sides are not
completely symmetric. Moreover, we can show that in the symmetric case where eA = eB = e
and sA = sB = s, this condition simplifies to
s
3
+ e ≤ 1,
which means that s and e cannot be too large simultaneously. Similarly, for overall profits to
be non-negative (that is, pii = pii,1 + δpii,2 ≥ 0), s and e cannot be too large simultaneously.
Indeed, when Conditions (B.1), (B.3) and (B.4) hold, the prices in Equation (B.2) are the
unique symmetric equilibrium prices. It follows from each platform’s profit function being
concave that there is a unique solution to the set of first-order conditions, which are linear.
C Proof of Proposition 3
If δA = δB = δF = δ > 0, and eA = eB = e > 0, Equation (B.2) becomes
pi0,1 = 1− e+
2δ
3
(s2i − si)−
δ
3(1− e2)(e
2s2i + esisj).
Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to si, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂si
=
δ
3(1− e2)
[
2(2− 3e2)si − 2(1− e2)− esj
]
,
∂2pi0,1
∂s2i
=
2δ(2− 3e2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3.
From this, we have
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=0 =
δ
3(1− e2)
[−2(1− e2)− esj] ,
which is always negative. Moreover, we have
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1 =
δ
3(1− e2)(2− 4e
2 − esj),
which is positive if
e < e¯ =
−sj +
√
s2j + 32
8
.
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Notice that e¯ is decreasing in sj, and e¯ =
√
1/2 <
√
2/3 when sj = 0. Therefore, p
i
0,1 is
U-shaped in si if e < e¯, and decreasing in si if e ≥ e¯.
Differentiating pi0,1 with respect to sj, we get
∂pi0,1
∂sj
= − δesi
3(1− e2) < 0.
Therefore, pi0,1 is decreasing in sj.
D Proof of Corollary 3
The first-order condition of pi0 with respect to si is
∂pi0
∂si
=
1
2
∂pi0,1
∂si
+
1
2
∂pj0,1
∂si
=
δ
6(1− e2)
[
2(2− 3e2)si − 2(1− e2)− 2esj
]
.
As in Proposition 3, we have ∂2pi0/∂s
2
i > 0 if e <
√
2/3, and ∂2pi0/∂s
2
i < 0 if e ≥
√
2/3.
Moreover, we have
∂pi0
∂si
|si=0 =
δ
6(1− e2)
[−2(1− e2)− 2esj] ,
which is always negative, and
∂pi0
∂si
|si=1 =
δ
6(1− e2)(2− 4e
2 − 2esj),
which is positive if
e < eˆ =
−sj +
√
s2j + 8
4
.
Notice that eˆ is decreasing in sj, and eˆ =
√
1/2 <
√
2/3 when sj = 0. Therefore, pi0 is
U-shaped in si if e < eˆ, and decreasing in si if e ≥ eˆ.
The first-order condition with respect to e is
∂pi0
∂e
=
1
2
∂pi0,1
∂e
+
1
2
∂pj0,1
∂e
+ δ(
1
2
∂pi0,2
∂e
+
1
2
∂pj0,2
∂e
).
Since prices in both periods are decreasing in e, it is easy to see that pi0 is also decreasing in e.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Since second-period prices are not affected by switching costs, the impact of switching costs on
consumer surplus is equal to the price reduction consumers enjoy with switching costs relative
to without minus the discounted second-period deadweight losses. More specifically, the change
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in consumer surplus is
∆W =W (s)−W (0)
=δ[
(3e2 − 2)s2 + 2(1− e2)s+ es2
3(1− e2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price reduction
−(s
2
− s
2
4
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deadweight loss
]
=δ(
(9e− 5)s2
12(1− e) +
s
6
),
which is a quadratic function.
Because we have
∂∆W
∂s
|s=0 = δ
6
,
which is always positive, and
∂∆W
∂s
|s=1 = δ
6
(1− 5− 9e
1− e ),
which is positive if e > 1/2, consumer surplus is increasing in s if e > 1/2, and it is inverted
U-shaped in s if e < 1/2. Furthermore, consumer surplus increases with switching costs for
all s ∈ [0, 1) if ∆W |s=1 > 0, which is satisfied for e ≥ 3/7. If e < 3/7, then there exists a
threshold sˆ = 2(1−e)
5−9e ∈ (0, 1) such that ∆W |s∈[0,sˆ) > 0 and ∆W |s∈[sˆ,1) < 0.
F Other Forms of Consumer Heterogeneity
Second Period Equilibrium
Given the first-period market shares nA0,1 and n
B
0,1, a consumer on side i, located at θ
i
0 on the
unit interval, purchased from platform 0 in the first period is indifferent between continuing to
buy from platform 0 and switching to platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi0 − pi0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi0)− pi1,2 − si.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi0 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 + si].
Another consumer on side i, positioned at θi1, previously purchased from platform 1 is
indifferent between switching to platform 0 and continuing to purchase from platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,2 − θi1 − pi0,2 − si = vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θi1)− pi1,2.
The indifferent consumer is given by
θi1 =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,2 − 1) + pi1,2 − pi0,2 − si].
The second-period demand for platform 0 on side i is then given by
ni0,2 = µin
i
0,1 + (1− µi)ni0,1θi0 + (1− µi)(1− ni0,1)θi1.
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Consumers of platform 0 consist of three types, and similarly for platform 1. The first type of
consumers has unchanged preferences and buys from platform 0 in both periods. The second
type of consumers has independent preferences across periods, but stays with platform 0 despite
having changing preferences. The third type of consumers also has changing preferences, and
indeed switches away from platform 1 to platform 0.
Solving for nA0,2 and n
B
0,2 in the above equations simultaneously, we obtain the second-period
market shares as follows:
ni0,2 =
γ + βi + (1− µi)(pi1,2 − pi0,2) + ei(1− µi)(1− µj)(pj1,2 − pj0,2)
2γ
,
where
γ =1− (1− µA)(1− µB)eAeB,
βi =(2n
i
0,1 − 1)(µi + (1− µi)si) + (2nj0,1 − 1)(1− µi)ei(µj + (1− µj)sj).
Because ei < 1, we have γ > 0.
Substituting the market shares into the profit function in Equation (1), and differentiating
it with respect to the prices, we obtain the following equations:
∂pi0,2
∂pi0,2
= ni0,2 −
pi0,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj0,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj),
∂pi1,2
∂pi1,2
= 1− ni0,2 −
pi1,2
2γ
(1− µi)−
pj1,2
2γ
ej(1− µi)(1− µj).
Solving the system of first-order conditions, one finds the following second-period equilib-
rium prices:
pi0,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi +
ηiλis¯i + iλj s¯j
(1− µi)∆ ,
pi1,2 =
1− ej(1− µi)
1− µi −
ηiλis¯i + iλj s¯j
(1− µi)∆ ,
where
∆ = 9− (1− µA)(1− µB)(eA + 2eB)(eB + 2eA) > 0,
λi = 2n
i
0,1 − 1,
ηi = 3− ej(ej + 2ei)(1− µi)(1− µj) > 0,
i = (1− µi)(ei − ej),
s¯i = µi + (1− µi)si.
First Period Equilibrium
I now turn to the first-period equilibrium outcomes when consumers are unattached. On side
i, a proportion αi of consumers are myopic (N) with δi = 0. They make decisions based on
their first-period utility only. The remaining 1 − αi of consumers on side i is farsighted (R)
with δi > 0. They make decisions based on their lifetime utility.
33
A myopic consumer on side i located at θiN is indifferent between buying from platform 0
and platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiN − pi0,1 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiN)− pi1,1,
which can be simplified to
θiN =
1
2
+
1
2
[ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1].
As for farsighted consumers, they also take into consideration their second-period utility.
If a consumer on side i located at θiR joins platform 0 in the first period, his expected second-
period utility is given by
U i0,2 = µi(vi + ein
j
0,2 − θiR − pi0,2) + (1− µi)
∫ θi0
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − x− pi0,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi0
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− x)− pi1,2 − si)dx,
which is the sum of three terms. With probability µi the consumer is loyal and chooses to
join platform 0 in both periods; with probability (1−µi)θi0 he has independent preferences but
still chooses to stay with platform 0; and with probability (1− µ)(1− θi0) he has independent
preferences and he switches to platform 1.
Similarly, if he joins platform 1 in the first period, his expected second-period utility is
given by
U i1,2 = µi(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− θiR)− pi1,2)
+ (1− µi)
∫ 1
θi1
(vi + ei(1− nj0,2)− (1− x)− pi1,2)dx
+ (1− µi)
∫ θi1
0
(vi + ein
j
0,2 − x− pi0,2 − si)dx.
A farsighted consumer on side i is indifferent between purchasing from platform 0 and
platform 1 if
vi + ein
j
0,1 − θiR − pi0,1 + δiU i0,2 = vi + ei(1− nj0,1)− (1− θiR)− pi1,1 + δiU i1,2,
and the indifferent consumer is given by
θiR =
1
2
+
ei(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δis¯i [(1−µi)(ei+2ej)λj s¯j+(3−∆)λis¯i](1−µi)∆
2(1 + δiµi)
.
The first-period market share of platform 0 on side i is
ni0,1 = αiθ
i
N + (1− αi)θiR.
Substitute θiN and θ
i
R into the above equation, and solve simultaneously for n
A
0,1 and n
B
0,1:
ni0,1 =
1
2
+
ei(1− κj s¯2j)(pi1,1 − pi0,1) + τj(eiτi + σis¯is¯j)(pj1,1 − pj0,1)
2[(1− κis¯2i )(1− κj s¯2j)− (eiτi + σis¯is¯j)(ejτj + σj s¯j s¯i)]
,
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where
τi =αi +
1− αi
1 + δiµi
,
κi =
δi(3−∆)(1− αi)
(1− µi)∆(1 + δiµi) ,
σi =
δi(ei + 2ej)(1− αi)
∆(1 + δiµi)
.
The expected profit of platform 0 is
pi0 = p
A
0,1n
A
0,1 + p
B
0,1n
B
0,1 + δFpi0,2.
The first-order conditions for maximizing pi0 with respect to p
A
0,1 and p
B
0,1 are given as follows:
∂pi0
∂pi0,1
= ni0,1 − pi0,1
τi(1− κj s¯2j)
2ϕ
− pj0,1
τi(ejτj + σj s¯j s¯i)
2ϕ
+ δF
[
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
∂ni0,1
∂pi0,1
+
∂pi0,2
∂nj0,1
∂nj0,1
∂pi0,1
]
where
ϕ =(1− κis¯2i )(1− κj s¯2j)− (eiτi + σis¯is¯j)(ejτj + σj s¯j s¯i),
∂pi0,2
∂ni0,1
=
[
6
(1− µi)∆ +
(ei − ej)− (ei + ej)(ej + 2ei)(1− µj)
∆
]
s¯i
def
= ξis¯i.
Similarly, there are two first-order conditions for platform 1.
In the platform-symmetric equilibrium, where pA0,1 = p
A
1,1 = p
A and pB0,1 = p
B
1,1 = p
B, the
sufficient condition for platform k’s profit being concave in its prices is as follows:
1− κAs¯2A > eAτA + σAs¯As¯B > 0; 1− κB s¯2B > eBτB + σB s¯B s¯A > 0.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the first-period equilibrium prices for side A and side B are
given respectively by
pA0,1 =
1− κAs¯2A
τA
− σB s¯B s¯A
τB
− eB− δF ξAs¯A; pB0,1 =
1− κB s¯2B
τB
− σAs¯As¯B
τA
− eA− δF ξB s¯B, (F.1)
and the second-period equilibrium prices are given by
pA0,2 =
1− eB(1− µA)
1− µA ; p
B
0,2 =
1− eA(1− µB)
1− µB .
To ensure that the above prices are indeed the equilibrium, we need the following conditions
to ensure that there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium prices both on and off the
equilibrium path:
vi > 2(
1
1− µi − ej) + 1− ei,
pi0,2(n
i
0,1 = 0, n
j
0,1 = 0) ≥ 0,
pii = pii,1 + δpii,2 ≥ 0,
pii0,2(n
i
0,1 = 1, n
j
0,1 = 1) ≥ µ(vi + ei − 1).
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The first inequality ensures that vi is big enough such that the market is covered. The second
inequality means that both platforms are active in the second period, given any market shares in
the first period and, in particular, the platform without any customer makes nonnegative profit
in the second period. In the symmetric case where eA = eB = e and sA = sB = s, this condition
simplifies to s/3 + e ≤ 1, which is also equivalent to the third condition under symmetry
assumptions, which in turn ensures that the overall equilibrium profit of each platform is
nonnegative. The last condition ensures that the platform with a large customer base has no
incentive to deviate to serve only its loyal customers in the second period (this condition is
derived as if the platform sells to all consumers in the first period, as this is the most tempting
scenario that provides the strongest incentive to sell only to the loyal consumers), and this
condition is satisfied when µ is small enough and vi is big, but not too big. For example, all
these conditions are satisfied when µ, s and e are not too large.
G Proof of Proposition 6
If δA = δB = 0, αA = αB = 1, µA = µB = 0, eA = eB = e > 0, and sA = sB = s > 0, Equation
(F.1) becomes
pi0,1 = 1− e−
2
3
δF s.
Differentiating it with respect to s, we obtain
∂pi0,1
∂s
< 0.
Moreover, the change in consumer surplus is
∆W = W (s)−W (0)
= δ[
2s
3︸︷︷︸
price reduction
−(s
2
− s
2
4
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deadweight loss
]
= δ( s
6
+ s
2
4
),
which is increasing in s.
H Proof of Proposition 7
Setting αA = αB = 0, µA = µB = µ > 0, and eA = eB = e > 0, we have
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=0,µ>0 < 0 if
2e2(1− µ)2 < 2µ(3e2(1− µ)2 − 2) + e(1− µ)(µ+ (1− µ)sj) + 2,
which is always satisfied when e ≥ 1
1−µ
√
2/3. Moreover, we have
∂2pi0,1
∂s2i
=
2δ(1− µ)
3(1− e2(1− µ)2)(2− 3e
2(1− µ)2).
Clearly, when e ≥ 1
1−µ
√
2/3, we have
∂2pi0,1
∂s2i
< 0. Thus, if e ≥ 1
1−µ
√
2/3 then pi0,1 is decreasing in
si. However, if e <
1
1−µ
√
2/3, pi0,1 may also be decreasing in si as long as
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=0,µ>0 < 0, which
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is satisfied when µ is small enough (e.g., µ < 1/2 is a sufficient condition), and
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ>0 ≤ 0.
From
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ>0 =
2δ(∆− 3)
∆
− 3δe
∆
(1− µ)(µ+ (1− µ)sj)− 2δ
3
(1− µ),
where ∆ = 9(1 − (1 − µ)2e2), we can see that the right hand side of this equation decreases
with e and is positive at e = 0. Taken together with the previous result that pi0,1 is decreasing
in si if e ≥ 11−µ
√
2/3, we can deduce that there exists a threshold e˜ such that
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ>0 ≤ 0
if e ≥ e˜, provided that µ is sufficiently small.
Recall that, in Proposition 3, with µ = 0, we have
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ=0 =
δ
3(1− e2)(2− 4e
2 − esj),
and e¯ is such that
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ=0 = 0 at e = e¯. Then, it is straightforward to show that
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ=0 <
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ>0,
and because
∂pi0,1
∂si
|si=1,µ≥0 is decreasing in e, we must have e˜ > e¯.
I Proof of Proposition 8
The first-order conditions of pik, k ∈ {0, 1}, with respect to pA0,1 and pB0,1 are, respectively,
nAk,1 −
1
2ω
pAk,1 −
e
2ω
pBk,1 −
δ
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
nBk,1 − (1 +
e2
2ω
)pBk,1 −
e
2ω
pAk,1 −
δe
2ω
∂pik,2
∂nA0,1
= 0,
where
ω = 1− e2 − δs
2
A(e
2 − 2γ)
3γ
.
To ensure that platform k’s profit is concave in its prices, we need ω ≥ 0, which means that δ,
sA and e are not too big.
The first-period equilibrium prices are as follows.
pA0,1 =1− e2 −
δ(3e2 − 2)s2A
3(1− e2) −
2δsA
3
− vBe
2
,
pB0,1 =
vB
2
.
To ensure that the above prices are indeed the equilibrium, we need vA and vB to be
relatively large so that the market is covered, and vA, vB ≥ 3 is a sufficient condition. This
condition also ensures that both platforms make nonnegative overall profits. Furthermore, we
need both platforms to be active in the second period, and this requires sA/3 + e
2 ≤ 1.
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For part (i), differentiate pA0,1 with respect to sA.
∂pA0,1
∂sA
= −2δ
3
− 2δ(3e
2 − 2)sA
3(1− e2) ,
∂2pA0,1
∂s2A
= −2δ(3e
2 − 2)
3(1− e2)
{
> 0 if e <
√
2/3,
< 0 if e ≥√2/3.
From this, we have
∂pA0,1
∂sA
|sA=0 = −
2δ
3
,
which is always negative. Moreover, we have
∂pA0,1
∂sA
|sA=1 =
2δ
3
(
2− 3e2
1− e2 − 1),
which is positive if e <
√
1/2. Therefore, pA0,1 is U-shaped in sA if e <
√
1/2, and decreasing
in sA if e ≥
√
1/2.
For part (iii), we compare the first-period prices paid by consumers who bear switching
costs (side A) and those who do not (side B) in the multi-homing model (denoted mh) with
that in the single-homing model (denoted sh) in Corollary 4.
For side A,
pAmh < p
A
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
For side B,
pBmh > p
B
sh if e+
vB
2
> 1.
J Proof of Proposition 9
We focus on the case where eA = eB = e, sA = sB = s, and δA = δB = δ. Given first-period
market shares ni0,1, let p
l,i
k,2 denote the second-period price charged by platform k ∈ {0, 1} to
consumers on side i ∈ {A,B} who have purchased from platform l ∈ {0, 1} in the first period.
Then, a consumer on side i, who has purchased from platform 0 in the first period, is indifferent
between staying with platform 0 and switching to platform 1 if he is located at
θi0 =
1
2
+
1
2
[e(2nj0,2 − 1) + p0,i1,2 − p0,i0,2 + s].
Similarly, a consumer, who has purchased from platform 1 in the first period, is indifferent
between staying with platform 1 and switching to platform 0 if he is located at
θi1 =
1
2
+
1
2
[e(2nj0,2 − 1) + p1,i1,2 − p1,i0,2 + s].
The second-period market share of platform 0 on side i is then
ni0,2 = n
i
0,1θ
i
0 + (1− ni0,1)θi1.
The second-period profit of platform 0 is given by
pi0,2 = p
0,A
0,2 n
A
0,1θ
A
0 + p
1,A
0,2 (1− nA0,1)θA1 + p0,B0,2 nB0,1θB0 + p1,B0,2 (1− nB0,1)θB1 .
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The profit function of platform 1 in the second period can be written in a similar way. Then,
we take first-order condition of each profit function with respect to the four prices (two on each
side). Together, we have eight first-order conditions with eight unknowns. Solving the system
of equations, we obtain the following second-period prices:
p0,i0,2 = p
1,i
1,2 = 1− e+
s
3
, p1,i0,2 = p
0,i
1,2 = 1− e−
s
3
, i ∈ {A,B} .
From these prices, we can calculate the difference in the expected second-period utility for a
consumer on side i from joining platform 0 in the first period compared to that from joining
platform 1, which is given by
U i0,2 − U i1,2 = (
s
3
)2
e
1− e2 [(2n
j
0,1 − 1) + e(2ni0,1 − 1)].
Then, in the first period, the indifferent consumer is located at
θiR =
1
2
+
1
2
[e(2nj0,1 − 1) + pi1,1 − pi0,1 + δ(U i0,2 − U i1,2)],
which also gives us the market share of platform 0 on side i in the first period, that is, ni0,1 = θ
i
R.
The expected profit of platform 0 is then given by
pi0 = p
A
0,1n
A
0,1 + p
B
0,1n
B
0,1 + δFpi0,2.
Taking the first-order conditions for both platforms, we obtain
pi0,1 = p
i
1,1 = 1− e+
2δ
3
(s2 − s)− δ
3
s2[2 +
e
3(1− e) ], i ∈ {A,B} .
References
[1] Attila Ambrus and Rossella Argenziano. Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1):17–52, 2009.
[2] Simon Anderson, Øystein Foros, and Hans Jarle Kind. Competition for Advertisers and
for Viewers in Media Markets. CEPR Discussion Paper, 2015. available at http://cepr.
org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10608#.
[3] Mark Armstrong. Competition in Two-Sided Markets. RAND Journal of Economics,
37(3):668–691, 2006a.
[4] Mark Armstrong. Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination. In
Richard Blundell, Whitney Newey, and Torsten Persson, editors, Advances in Economics
and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New York, U.S.A., 2006b.
[5] Gary Biglaiser and Jacques Cre´mer. Equilibria in an Infinite Horizon Game with an Incum-
bent, Entry and Switching Costs. International Journal of Economic Theory, 7(1):65–75,
2011.
39
[6] Gary Biglaiser and Jacques Cre´mer. Switching Costs and Network Effects in Competition
Policy. In Joseph Harrington and Yannis Katsoulacos, editors, Recent Advances in the
Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K., 2014.
[7] Gary Biglaiser and Jacques Cre´mer. The Value of Incumbency in Heterogeneous Networks.
Working Paper, 2016. available at http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/
documents/doc/wp/2016/wp_tse_630.pdf.
[8] Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Cre´mer, and Gergely Dobos. The Value of Switching Costs.
Journal of Economic Theory, 148(3):935–952, 2013.
[9] Severin Borenstein, Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, and Janet Netz. Exercising Market Power in
Proprietary Aftermarkets. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(2):157–188,
2000.
[10] Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien. Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation
Service Providers. RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2):309–328, 2003.
[11] Yongmin Chen. Paying Customers to Switch. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 6(4):877–897, 1997.
[12] Liran Einav and Paulo Somaini. A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets. Journal
of Industrial Economics, 61(4):938–986, 2013.
[13] David Evans and Richard Schmalensee. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform
Businesses. In Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol, editors, Oxford Handbook on International
Antitrust Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 2014.
[14] Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer. Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switch-
ing Costs and Network Effects. In Mark Armstrong and Rob Porter, editors, Handbook of
Industrial Organization. North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2007.
[15] Jean Gabszewicz, Lynne Pepall, and Jacques-Franc¸ois Thisse. Sequential Entry with
Brand Loyalty Caused by Consumer Learning-by-Using. Journal of Industrial Economics,
40(4):397–416, 1992.
[16] Renato Gomes and Alessandro Pavan. Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design. Work-
ing Paper, 2013. available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
papers/1559.pdf.
[17] Paul Klemperer. Markets with Consumer Switching Costs. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 102(2):375–394, 1987a.
[18] Paul Klemperer. The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs. RAND Journal
of Economics, 18(1):138–150, 1987b.
40
[19] Paul Klemperer. Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with
Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 62:515–539, 1995.
[20] Jonathan Levin. The Economics of Internet Markets. Working Paper, 2011. available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16852.
[21] Qihong Liu and Konstantinos Serfes. Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets. Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy, 22(4):768–786, 2013.
[22] National Economic Research Associates. Switching Costs. Report prepared for the Office
of Fair Trading and the Department of Trade, U.K., 2003.
[23] Tore Nilssen. Two Kinds of Consumer Switching Costs. RAND Journal of Economics,
23(4):579–589, 1992.
[24] Andrew Rhodes. Re-examining the Effects of Switching Costs. Economic Theory,
57(1):161–194, 2014.
[25] Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets. Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association, 1(4):990–1029, 2003.
[26] Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. Two-Sided Markets: a Progress Report. RAND
Journal of Economics, 37(3):645–667, 2006.
[27] Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda. When Do Switching Costs Make Markets More or Less Compet-
itive? Working Paper, 2013. available at http://webmeets.com/files/papers/EARIE/
2014/450/SwitchingCosts.pdf.
[28] Marc Rysman. The Economics of Two-sided Markets. Journal of Economic Perspective,
23(3):125–143, 2009.
[29] Su Su and Na Zeng. The Analysis of Two Period Equilibrium of Two-Sided Competing
Platforms. Conference Proceedings, 2008. available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
xpl/articleDetails.jsp?reload=true&arnumber=4680225.
[30] Irina Suleymanova and Christian Wey. Bertrand Competition in Markets with Network
Effects and Switching Costs. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 11(1):Ar-
ticle 56, 2011.
[31] Curtis Taylor. Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription
Markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 34(2):223–246, 2003.
[32] Christian von Weizsa¨cker. The Costs of Substitution. Econometrica, 52(5):1085–1116,
1984.
[33] Glen Weyl. A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms. American Economic Review,
100(4):1642–1672, 2010.
41
[34] Julian Wright. One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets. Review of Network Economics,
3(1):44–64, 2004.
42
